C.V

Casey Rebecca Johnson
Department of Politics and Philosophy
205E Administration Building, University of Idaho
(609-977-0135)

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of Politics and Philosophy, University of Idaho, 2017-current
Post-Doctoral Fellow, The Humanities Institute: “Humility and Conviction in Public Life”, University of Connecticut, 2015-2017
Pre-Doctoral Fellow, Northwestern University’s Mellon Foundation Sawyer Seminar: “Theoretical Issues in Social Epistemology”, 2014-2015
Visiting Scholar, Northwestern University, January – February, 2013

Education
Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 2015
Committee: Michael Lynch, Thomas Bontly, Mitchell Green, Lionel Shapiro
Dissertation: “Speech Acts and Silencing: Applying a New Account of Illocutions To Debates over Silencing and Testimony”
M.A. (in Philosophy), University of Connecticut, 2011
B.A. (Philosophy and English double major), cum laude Connecticut College, 2007

Areas of Specialization
Social Epistemology, Feminist Philosophy of Language

Areas of Competence
Ethics, Comparative Philosophy

Publications
Peer Reviewed
"Investigating Illocutionary Monism" (Forthcoming) Synthese

"What Norm of Assertion?" (2017), Acta Analytica

“Intellectual Humility: an Annotated Bibliography”, (2017) in Oxford Bibliographies, with Michael Lynch, Hanna Gunn, and Nathan Sheff. 

“Intellectual Humility and Empathy by Analogy” (2017) Topoi

“If You Don’t Have Anything Nice to Say, Come Sit By Me: Gossip as Epistemic Good and Evil”, (2016), Social Theory and Practice

“Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion”, (2015), International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Edited Volumes
Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. Under Contract. Routledge

Invited Talks and Presentations
"Illocutionary Monism and Illocutionary Pluralism" Assertion: Foundational Issues, ConceptLab, Oslo, Norway, September 2017

“Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement”, Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, England, July 2017

“Perceptions of Expertise and the Division of Epistemic Labor”, Pathologies of Public Discourse Workshop, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark, December 2016

“Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement”, Junior Keynote, UConn Philosophy Graduate Student Conference, CT, November, 2016

“Just Say ‘No’: Obligations to Voice Disagreement”, Connecticut College, New London, CT, October 2016

“Empathy and Intellectual Humility by Analogy”, European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, St. Andrews Scotland, August, 2016

“Objective Illocutionary Force?”, Northern New England PhilosophyAssociation, Bates College, September, 2015

“Objective Illocutionary Force?”, Northwestern University PhLing Group, Northwestern University, May, 2015

“If You Don’t Have Anything Nice to Say, Come Sit By Me”, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, LA, April, 2015

“Objective Illocutionary Force?”, Women in Philosophy-Chicago Area Workshop, Chicago, IL, February 2015

“Communicative Injustice”, Understanding Epistemic Injustice Conference, Bristol University, Bristol UK, June 2014

“Failing to Count,” American Philosophical Association Central Division Meeting, Chicago, February 2014       

“The Contextual Knowledge Norm of Assertion,” Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Austin, TX, February 2013

“Reconstituting Assertion,” Northwestern Epistemology Research Group, Northwestern University, January 2013

Honors and Awards
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology Travel Award, 2015
Provost’s Commendation for Teaching Excellence, fall 2013, spring 2014
APA Graduate Student Stipend, Central Division, 2014
Jerome A. Shaffer Fellowship, UConn Philosophy Department, 2012
UConn Dissertation Summer Research Fellowship, 2012
Professor Leister Reise Prize, Philosophy Department, Connecticut College, 2007
ConnSSHARP Research Award for Summer Research in the Humanities, Connecticut College, 2006

Teaching Experience
As Instructor of Record:
Philosophy and Social Ethics
University of Connecticut, Avery Point (Fall 2011)
University of Connecticut, Storrs – Student Support Services Program (summer 2012, summer 2013, summer 2014)
University of Connecticut, Storrs (fall 2013, spring 2014)
University of Connecticut, Hartford (fall 2012, spring 2013)
Non-Western and Comparative Philosophy
University of Connecticut, Avery Point (spring 2012)
Problems of Philosophy
University of Connecticut, Hartford (summer 2011)
As Graduate Teaching Assistant:
Philosophy and Social Ethics
University of Connecticut, Storrs (fall 2009, spring 2010, fall 2010, spring 2011, spring 2012)

Service
Editorial Assistant to Erkenntnis Associate Editor (fall 2013-spring 2014)
Referee for Erkenntnis (2014, 2015)
Referee for Episteme (2013)
Head TA Mentor, University of Connecticut Philosophy Department Teaching Assistant Mentorship program (2012-2014)
Librarian of the UCONN Philosophy Graduate Student Organization (2011-2012)
Secretary of the UCONN Graduate Student Organization (2010-2011)

Graduate Course Work
Epistemology
Epistemic Contextualism and Relativism (Michael Lynch and Patrick Greenough)
Metaphysics of Epistemic Reason (Michael Lynch)
Feminist Philosophy of Science (Anne Hiskes)
Normative Epistemology (Baron Reed) Audit at Northwestern University
Social Epistemology (Jennifer Lackey) Audit at Northwestern University
The Science of Rational Belief and Group Decision Making (Matthew Kopec) Audit at Northwestern University

Logic and Language
Relativism and Pragmatism (Lionel Shapiro)
Philosophy of Mathematics (Marcus Rossberg)
Truth and Paradox (Jc Beall)
Logic (Jc Beall)
Pragmatism (Mitchell Green) Audit

Metaphysics
Composition as Identity (Donald Baxter)
Philosophy of Mind (Thomas Bontly)
Ontology of Ordinary Objects (Crawford Elder)

History
British Empiricism (Donald Baxter)
Asian Philosophy (Joel Kupperman)
Essentialism: Ancient and Modern (Samuel Wheeler)
History of Analytic Philosophy (Samuel Wheeler)

Moral Theory
Seminar in Moral Philosophy (Paul Bloomfield)

Dissertation Abstract
In Speech Acts and Silencing, I develop a new, socially sensitive, account of conversation in general, and of assertion in particular.  According to traditional speech act theory, an utterance is a particular conversational move, like a question or a promise, when it has the kind of force associated with that move.  Traditionally, this force – called illocutionary force – has been understood in terms of various conditions, norms, and constraints that utterances either meet or fail to meet.  This tradition has led some philosophers to attempt to account for this force by way of a constitutive norm.  Assertion, in particular, has received this kind of attention.  In my first two chapters, I argue that this way of understanding assertion is misguided, as there is no constitutive norm of assertion.  Nonetheless, I argue, we can account for illocutionary force.
            The third chapter outlines my new position.  Illocutionary force, I argue, is relative to perspective.  As participants in conversations perceive and register social changes made by speech, they form expectations and assign one another obligations. These expectations and obligations are the hallmarks of illocutionary force.  When a speaker is perceived as asserting, for example, the perceiver of that force forms expectations, including that the speaker will behave as if they believe the content asserted.  Of course, participants may not all agree on the expectations and obligations generated by an utterance.  So, the force that an utterance has is relative to the expectations it generates in each participant in the conversation.
            While this account of illocutionary force is new, it has applications to extant debates.  In particular, it has applications to our understanding of communicative justice.  In my last two chapters I apply my new account of illocutionary force to the debates over unjust restrictions on speech and testimony.  Social and political factors influence the ways in which participants perceive utterances.  Because these perceptions are central to my account of illocutionary force, this account is well placed to help us understand the ways in which speakers are restricted unjustly in their ability to act with speech.

References
Michael P. Lynch, Professor of Philosophy, http://www.philosophy.uconn.edu/department/lynch/Home.html
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344
Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269 USA, mplynch@uconn.edu

Lionel Shapiro, Associate Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344
Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269 USA, Lionel.Shapiro@uconn.edu

Thomas Bontly, Associate Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344
Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269 USA, Thomas.Bontly@uconn.edu

Mitchell Green, Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344
Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT 06269 USA, Mitchell.Green@uconn.edu  

Sanford Goldberg, Professor of Philosophy
Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 1860 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208, USA, s-goldberg@northwestern.edu



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